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I. INTRODUCTION
After the horrors of both World Wars, protection of human rights 
became a focus of the international community.  In the post-war period, 
as armed conflicts between states became less common and protections
for human rights expanded, violations of those rights by state and non-
state actors increased. The legality of intervention by a state or group of
states in humanitarian crises is still unsettled. Given the increased
interconnectivity of the world’s populations, images of and outrage over 
human rights violations spread far more quickly and widely than ever 
before. In cases of gross violations of human rights there is inherent
tension between a state’s reluctance to intervene because of the unsettled
378
GRAMYK FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2018 4:59 PM       
 



























[VOL. 15:  377, 2014] Increased Franco-British Military Cooperation 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
legal status and costs of international intervention and the pressure by 
the civilian population to prevent and halt human suffering. 
Humanitarian intervention requires many resources, particularly military 
and civilian capabilities, but there are few states with both the ability and 
political will to intervene.1  Cooperation between those few states is 
necessary for successful intervention to halt or prevent human rights
violations, but some states are more willing to collaborate than others. 
On November 2, 2010, France and the United Kingdom (UK) signed the 
Treaty for Defense and Security Cooperation, which envisions greater
bilateral military cooperation than ever before.2  This Treaty is a natural
outgrowth of prior Franco-British attempts to encourage European defense
cooperation, but it is also an innovative approach to collective security 
and defense. The probability of humanitarian interventions supported by
one or both of these nations will likely increase because of the merger of 
the similar worldviews and political intentions of the two states with the 
effects of the Treaty—greater efficiency, cooperation, and capabilities. 
Both France and the UK possess the political will to expand their global 
influence and, in particular, to exercise power in the humanitarian sphere.
While France and the UK have previously expressed the desire to intervene 
in humanitarian crises, they both lacked the individual military capabilities 
to do so without the support and contribution of the United States.3 
Increased military cooperation between France and the UK, accompanied 
by a strong commitment to the development of capabilities that neither
formerly possessed, will allow both France and the UK to lead interventions 
where the United States or other major states do not wish to commit
themselves. 
Section II of this Article addresses the current legal framework of
humanitarian intervention.  Section III examines previous attempts at
international military cooperation by the United Nations, NATO, EU, 
and bilateral arrangements, Section IV considers the scope and
implementation of the Treaty between France and the UK.  Finally, Section 
1. See discussion infra Parts II, III. 
2. Treaty for Defence and Security Co-Operation, Nov. 2, 2010, Fr.-U.K., Gr. 
Brit. T.S. No. 36 (2011) (Cm. 7976); Loi 2011-1190 du 26 September 2011 de traité de 
coopération en matière de défense et de sécurité, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Sept. 28 2011, p. 16320 [hereinafter
2010 Defense and Security Treaty].
3. See discussion, infra Part III, IV. 
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V analyzes the interplay of international law and the bilateral military
treaty in recent international humanitarian interventions. 




International law principles are devoted to maintaining peace and security 
in the international system as well as respecting the tenets of sovereignty
and non-intervention, which are central to the system’s stability.  The 
concept of humanitarian intervention, defined as, “dictatorial interference
by a State in the affairs of another State for the purpose of maintaining 
or altering the actual condition of things,”4 runs counter to the guiding
principles of international law, yet states have practiced such intervention 
throughout history.
Prior to the establishment of the United Nations, customary international 
law seemed to accept intervention on humanitarian grounds even though 
international law, at the time, did not guarantee essential human rights.5 
Popular support for humanitarian interventions provided a foundation for
the legality of collective action.6  Great powers intervened on behalf of
threatened minorities throughout the 19th and 20th centuries: Great 
Britain, France, and Russia acted in Greece in 1827;7 France interceded 
in Syria, at the time a part of the Ottoman Empire, to protect Christians in
1860;8 and Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia entered Macedonia on behalf of
Christians in 1912.9
 4. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, VOL. 1: PEACE 181 (Ronald
P. Roxburgh ed., Longmans, Green and Co. 3d ed. 1920). 
5. Id. at 186, 346 (“Many jurists maintain that intervention is likewise 
admissible, or even has a basis of right, when exercised in the interest of humanity for 
the purpose of stopping religious persecution and endless cruelties in time of peace and 
war. That the Powers have in the past exercised intervention on these grounds, there is 
no doubt . . . But whether there is really a rule of the Law of Nations which admits such
interventions may well be doubted.  Yet, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that 
public opinion and the attitude of the Powers are in favour of such interventions, and it
may perhaps be said that in time the Law of Nations will recognise the rule that
interventions in the interests of humanity are admissible provided they are exercised in 
the form of a collective intervention of the Powers.” Id. at 186–87.). 
6. Id. at 186, 347. 
7. Id. at 186. 
8. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 569 (Oxford
University Press 5th ed. 1998). 
9. Barry M. Benjamin, Note, Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention: Legalizing
the Use of Force to Prevent Human Rights Atrocities, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 120, 129 
(1993). For an in-depth analysis of European interventions in the Ottoman Empire on
the basis of humanitarian concerns, see DAVIDE RODOGNO, AGAINST MASSACRE:
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1815-1914 (Princeton University
Press 2011) (explaining the emergence of a European concept and international practice). 
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The types of humanitarian intervention practiced by European States 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were based primarily on 
State interest and were therefore applied unequally.10  The principal 
basis for modern international human rights law is the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).11  The Charter of the United 
Nations (the Charter) also provides a basis for the protection of human
rights in international law.12  Instruments created after the UDHR and 
the Charter, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, have further strengthened the protections of human rights in
international law.13 
A. The United Nations and the Intervention Issue 
In the years following the First World War, the international community
tried to sustain peace by outlawing wars of aggression and encouraging
peaceful means of dispute resolution.  The League of Nations, established in
1920, obliged signatory states to avoid war, and called for sanctions on 
those that did wage war.14  The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 also purported
to outlaw war and called for resolution of conflicts only by peaceable
means.15  However, since neither agreement provided the international 
community with the means to enforce such provisions, little could in fact
be done to prevent the outbreak of World War II. 
The founders of the United Nations (UN), created by an international
community that had twice suffered the “scourge of war,”16 intended to 
preserve international peace and security, protect fundamental human
 10. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 569. 
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
12. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 573. 
13. Id. at 577. 
14.  League of Nations Covenant pmbl.; id. art. 16. 
15. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, 
Aug. 27, 1928, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter the Kellogg-Briand Pact]. “The High
Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they
condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it 
as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.” Id. art. 1. “The 
High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts 
of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, 
shall never be sought except by pacific means.” Id. art 2.
16.  U.N. Charter pmbl. 
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rights, and prevent the outbreak of armed conflict.17  The calls embodied
in the League of Nations Charter and Kellogg-Briand Pact for peaceful
resolution of international conflicts are echoed in Article 2 of the UN 
Charter,18 which also purports to prohibit the threat or use of force against 
another sovereign state.19 That prohibition, however, does not apply to a 
state’s use of force in self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.20 
The Security Council of the UN (Security Council) is composed of five
permanent members—United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, 
and China—and ten rotating elected members.21  The Security Council’s
task is to identify threats to international peace and security and determine
the appropriate measures to respond to such threats—measures which
may include armed force.22  Because Security Council resolutions to
authorize intervention are subject to the veto of a permanent member,23 
collective intervention was essentially impossible during the Cold War 
period (1948–1991).24  UN peacekeeping operations provided for under 
Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter require a voluntary commitment 
of troops, military police, and other personnel from Member States.25 
Member States pay for the expenses of peacekeeping operations based
upon a formula that considers the relative economic wealth of each country 
and requires the five permanent members of the Security Council to pay 
17. Id. art. 1.
 18. Id. art. 2, ¶ 3 (“All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not 
endangered.”). 
19. Id. art. 2, ¶ 4. (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
20. Id. art. 51. (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”).
21. Id. art. 23, ¶ 1. 
22. Id. arts. 39–42. 
23. Id. art. 27, ¶ 3; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
[ICISS], The Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 6.20 (Dec. 2001), available at http://
responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS Report]. 
 24. Louis Henkin, NATO’s Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law of
Humanitarian Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 825 (Oct. 1999); ICISS Report, 
supra note 23, ¶ 6.16 (“Although these powers were interpreted narrowly during the 
Cold War, since then the Security Council has taken a very expansive view as to what
constitutes ‘international peace and security.’”).
25. See UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS & DEP’T OF FIELD 
SUPPORT (DPKO/DFS), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 
13–14 (2008), http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. 
382
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a larger share of the peacekeeping budget.26  In 2013, the United States 
paid 28.38% of the UN peacekeeping budget, the UK paid 6.68%, and 
France paid 7.22%.27  These three states, along with Japan and Germany, 
comprise the top five providers of assessed contributors to the peacekeeping 
budget.28  The support of permanent members is essential for humanitarian
intervention, as was demonstrated by attempts to intervene in the
1990s.29  U.S. support was particularly essential because it was usually the
only state with both the necessary military capabilities and the political
will to intervene, although the will to intervene was usually shared by
the UK, France, and other states.30 
B. International Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has expressed a 
willingness to classify internal conflicts of a state with gross human 
rights violations as a threat to international peace and security.31 This
was demonstrated in the resolutions regarding Iraq in 1991, Somalia in 
1992, and Rwanda in 1994.32  NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999,
undertaken without explicit Security Council authorization, brought
renewed debate regarding the legality of humanitarian intervention since 
it necessarily requires a violation of state sovereignty; specifically, 
26. Financing Peacekeeping 2011–2012, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, http:// 
www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml. 
27. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of General Assembly Resolutions 
55/235 and 55/236: Rep. of the Secretary-General, add. 1, annex, U.N. Doc. A/67/224/Add.1
(Dec. 27, 2012). A new scale of assessments for 2013–2015 was adopted in G.A. Res. 
67/238, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/238 (Feb. 11, 2013), and the updated composition of levels
for the same period was endorsed in G.A. Res. 67/239, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/239 (Feb. 
11, 2013). Id. The effective rates for the period 2014–2015 will remain fairly consistent 
with the 2013 levels—28.36% for the United States; 6.68% for the UK; and 7.21% for
France. Id.
 28. Id.
 29. See discussion, infra part B.
30. France and the UK were among the countries negotiating with the Serbs before
NATO intervened in Kosovo.  Jason Dominguez Meyer, From Paralysis in Rwanda to
Boldness in Libya: Has the International Community Taken “Responsibility to Protect” 
from Abstract Principle to Concrete Norm Under International Law?, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L 
L. 87, 91–94 (2011). 
31. Henkin, supra note 24, at 825. 
32. Id.; Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime
Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 368 (2012). 
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territorial sovereignty.33  Critics of intervention feared states would use it 
to disguise interference in the internal affairs of other states or that
secessionist movements would provoke human rights violations in order
to elicit international intervention.34  They also suggested inconsistent 
application of the doctrine of intervention in weak versus strong states.35 
In response to these critics, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, posed 
the following question to the General Assembly: 
[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty,
how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?36 
The Secretary-General called on the Member States to attempt to resolve
the debate.  In response, Canada established the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to develop a solution and
find a common ground for humanitarian intervention.37 
C. The Legal Basis of Humanitarian Intervention: “The Right to 

Intervene” or “The Responsibility to Protect”? 

The report issued by the ICISS, entitled “The Responsibility to Protect,”
purported to change the language of the intervention debate.  Previously, 
the legality of humanitarian intervention had been characterized as a 
state’s “right to intervene” to halt gross violations.38  The report proposed a
doctrine called “the responsibility to protect” (R2P), which places a 
burden on both the individual state and the international community.39 
Implied in a state’s sovereignty is its duty to protect its people from harm.40 
The international responsibility to protect only transcends the principle 
of non-intervention when a population is suffering serious harm and the 
state in question is unwilling or unable to stop it.41  The duty of the
international community encompasses three specific obligations: the 
responsibility to prevent humanitarian crises, to react to gross violations 
of human rights, and to rebuild after such violations cease.42
 33. Henkin, supra note 24, at 825–27. 
34. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: the Role of the United Nations in the
21st Century, ¶ 216, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar 27, 2000), available at http://unpan1.
un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan000923.pdf. 
35. Id.
 36. Id. ¶ 217. 
37. ICISS Report, supra note 23, ¶ 1.7. 
38. Id. ¶ 2.4. 
39. See ICISS Report, supra note 23, pt. 2.
40. Id. ¶¶ 2.14–2.15, 2.30. 
41. Id. ¶¶ 2.7, 2.27, 2.31. 
42. Id. ¶ 2.32. 
384
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The report identified six criteria for military intervention: right authority, 
just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable 
prospects of success.43  The right authority to authorize a military 
intervention comes from a resolution of the Security Council or, perhaps 
even a widely-supported General Assembly resolution.44  The international 
community must have just cause to intervene45 as well as the right intention 
for intervention—“to halt or avert human suffering.”46  Intervention must
be the last resort, meaning that “[e]very diplomatic and non-military avenue
for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the humanitarian crisis must
have been explored.”47  The intervention must use proportional means48 and 
it must have reasonable prospects of success in halting or averting the 
suffering that originally triggered the intervention.49 
The UN has seemingly embraced the R2P doctrine.  For example, the
UN General Assembly adopted a version of the “responsibility to protect”
in its 2005 World Summit Outcome Resolution, which recognized the
responsibility of states to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing,
and crimes against humanity.50  While this resolution instructed nations to
help protect populations from these harms by first attempting peaceful 
means, it also expressed the General Assembly’s vision of military
 43. See id. pt. 6. 
44. “. . . [T]here is no better or more appropriate body than the Security Council 
to deal with military intervention issues for human protection purposes.  It is the Security
Council which should be making the hard decisions in the hard cases about overriding 
state sovereignty.” Id. ¶ 6.14. But the Report points to the recommendatory powers of
the General Assembly and prior General Assembly resolutions authorizing operations in
Korea (1950), Egypt (1956), and the Congo (1960) to support its claim that “even in the
absence of Security Council endorsement . . . an intervention which took place with the 
backing of a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly would clearly have powerful moral 
and political support” sufficient to support an authorization of intervention.  Id. ¶ 6.7. 
45. The Commission identifies two broad circumstances in which military 
intervention would be justified—”to halt or avert: large scale loss of life, actual or
apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state 
action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale ‘ethnic 
cleansing,’ actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts 
of terror, or rape.” Id. ¶ 4.19. 
46. Id. ¶ 4.33. 
47. Id. ¶ 4.37. 
48. Id. ¶ 4.39 (“The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention 
should be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question.”). 
49. Id. ¶ 4.41. 
50. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 
60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
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intervention.51  This version of R2P intervention is apparently limited to
interventions under the authority of the Security Council (Chapter VII of
the United Nations charter), and only in situations involving genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.  However, the 
General Assembly declined to establish any guidelines for military
intervention, explicitly stating the need for a case-by-case determination.52 
In 2006, Security Council Resolution 1674 explicitly reaffirmed the 
version of R2P embodied in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Resolution.53 
Resolution 1674 confirmed prior Security Council resolutions on the 
protection of civilians in times of conflict, which referred to instances 
where humanitarian intervention would be considered.54  The Resolution 
reiterated the Security Council’s practice of including provisions for the
protection of civilians in peacekeeping mandates.55  These UN resolutions,
particularly the support of the Security Council of the General Assembly’s 
version of R2P, give the doctrine greater legal support.
 51. Id. ¶ 139 (“[W]e are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter
VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity.”).
52. Id.
53. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (April 28, 2006) (“Reaffirms the
provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity”).
54. Id. (“Reaffirming its resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the
protection of civilians in armed conflict . . .”); S.C. Res. 1296, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 
1296 (April 19, 2000) (“Indicates its willingness to consider the appropriateness and 
feasibility of temporary security zones and safe corridors for the protection of civilians 
and the delivery of assistance in situations characterized by the threat of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes against the civilian population”). 
55. S.C. Res. 1674, supra note 53, ¶ 13, 16 (“Urges the international community
to provide support and assistance to enable States to fulfill their responsibilities 
regarding the protection of refugees and other persons protected under international 
humanitarian law. . . .Reaffirms its practice of ensuring that the mandates of United 
Nations peacekeeping, political and peacebuilding missions include, where appropriate 
and on a case-by-case basis, provisions regarding (i) the protection of civilians,
particularly those under imminent threat of physical danger within their zones of
operation. . .”). 
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D. The Impact of the United Nations Security Council 

Veto on Intervention 

Military intervention requires UN authorization for legitimacy, preferably
in the form of a Security Council resolution.56  The veto held by the
permanent members of the Security Council is the greatest impediment to
issuing a resolution authorizing intervention in cases where political will
to intervene exists. Security Council action is often thwarted by use of a 
member’s veto.  NATO intervened in Kosovo in 1999, but without prior, 
explicit authorization by the Security Council because of (not-unfounded) 
fears that Russia would reject any resolution calling for military intervention 
in the former Yugoslavia.57 The ICISS proposed that the Security Council 
members implement a “code of conduct” whereby a permanent member
could not use the veto to prevent humanitarian intervention in cases where
its vital national interests were not involved.58  The Security Council has 
yet to officially implement this suggestion, so the use of the veto power 
still threatens any proposed humanitarian intervention action by the UN. 
A positive sign for the future use of humanitarian intervention came 
with the vote on Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorized the 
implementation of a “no-fly” zone over Libya.59  The vote—taken on 
56. ICISS Report, supra note 23, ¶ 6.15 (“The Commission accordingly is agreed
that: Security Council Authorization must in all cases be sough prior to any military
intervention action being carried out.  Those calling for an intervention must formally
request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or
have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter. . .”); Henkin, 
supra note 24, at 826 (“In my view, the law is, and ought to be, that unilateral intervention by
military force by a state or group of states is unlawful unless authorized by the Security
Council.”); but see Benjamin, Note, Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 9, 
at 122–23 nn. 12–15 (identifying authors arguing for legalization of unilateral intervention). 
57. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Rejects Demand For Cessation 
of Use of Force Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release SC/6659 
(Mar. 26, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990326.sc6659.
html. Two permanent members of the Security Council (Russia and China) voted for a 
resolution condemning NATO’s use of force in the former Yugoslavia.  While the vote 
was 12–3 against the resolution, the opposition of two countries with veto power to the 
intervention indicated that an attempt to issue a Security Council resolution calling for 
intervention would have failed. Id.
 58. ICISS Report, supra note 23, ¶ 6.21 (“It is unrealistic to imagine any
amendment of the Charter happening any time son so far as the veto power and its 
distribution are concerned.  But the adoption by the permanent members of a more
formal, mutually agreed practice to govern these situations in the future would be a very
healthy development.”).
59.  S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
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March 17, 2011—included ten votes in support and five abstentions.  Russia 
and China, the permanent members that opposed military intervention in 
Libya, both chose not to prevent such intervention through use of their 
veto.60  Conversely, in 2012, Russia and China both vetoed a draft Security
Council resolution—supported by all other members—which called for a 
halt of violence by all parties in Syria and the implementation of a peace 
plan proposed by the Arab League.61 
The Security Council and the General Assembly must balance the use 
of collective action in humanitarian crises against objections that doing 
so amounts to a violation of state sovereignty.  In an effort to limit criticism 
of collective action, the international community has chosen to narrow 
the scope of potential humanitarian interventions and limit its use to
cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic
cleansing, where the moral duty to end the harm can be more easily agreed
upon.
Past intervention success evidences that neutral intervention—with little
or no self-interested motivation on the part of the intervening state—to
prevent human suffering is possible.62  While humanitarian concerns will
60. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ 
Over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by a Vote of 10
in Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011), available
at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.  Both Russia and China, 
along with the other abstentions (Brazil, Germany, and India) emphasized that the 
abstention was not meant as support for the actions of the Libyan government against 
civilians, and noted the desire to halt the suffering.  However, those who abstained did 
not believe the time for military intervention had come, and preferred that a diplomatic 
or ‘soft power’ approach be taken.  China specifically noted that it did not block the 
resolution because of the requests of the Arab League and the African Union that a no-
fly zone be established. Id.
61. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft
Resolution on Syria as Russian Federation, China Veto Text Supporting Arab League’s
Proposed Peace Plan, U.N. Press Release SC/10536 (Feb. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10536.doc.htm. The representatives of the 
other permanent members condemned the use of the veto (“It is a sad day for the 
Council, a sad day for Syrians, and a sad day for all friends of democracy,” (quoting
Gérard Araud, France); the United States was “disgusted” at the use of the veto by
members who had “sold out the Syrian people to shield a craven tyrant,” (quoting Susan 
Rice, United States); and the United Kingdom was “appalled” by the use of the veto
(quoting Mark Lyall Grant, United Kingdom)).  Id. See also Neal MacFarquar, U.N. 
Resolution on Syria Blocked by Russia and China, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/world/middleeast/russia-and-china-block-united-nations­
resolution-on-syria.html?pagewanted=all; Sebnem Arsu & Hwaida Saad, Turkey Faults 
U.N. Inaction Over Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
10/14/world/middleeast/syria.html?src=recg.
62. Jon Western & Joshua S. Goldstein, Humanitarian Intervention Comes of Age:
Lessons from Somalia to Libya, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov./Dec. 2011, http://www.foreign 
affairs.com/articles/136502/jon-western-and-joshua-s-goldstein/humanitarian-intervention­
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most likely never be the single impetus behind an intervention staged by
the international community, it is not necessary to intercede on behalf of
only one party in an ongoing conflict in order to protect civilians. More 
states and multinational regional organizations, such as the EU, must
provide the UN with the means necessary to successfully stage clearly 
guided operations.
III. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION: MULTILATERAL AND 
REGIONAL ATTEMPTS
Since the end of World War II, the international community increasingly 
focused on multinational organizations as a means to protect stability
and security. However, as humanitarian crises became a greater concern, it
became clear that military force may be necessary when diplomacy alone 
proved insufficient.  Albeit international military cooperation was originally
implemented to ensure national security, it might also be successfully
used against the security threat of gross human rights violations. 
A. Regional Multilateral Organizations 
Regional multinational organizations seek to provide defense and
intervention capabilities through military cooperation.  The UN Charter 
does not preclude regional organizations from promoting international 
peace and security, so long as such organizations act in a manner consistent 
with the purposes and principles of the UN.63 Such regional organizations
may be used by the Security Council to exercise its enforcement power
under the Charter.64  Multinational regional organizations designed to
increase the security of members include the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Arab League, and the African Union.
comes-of-age (“As Libya and the international community prepare for the post-Qaddafi
transition, it is important to examine the big picture of humanitarian intervention - and
the big picture is decidedly positive.  Over the last 20 years, the international community
has grown increasingly adept at using military force to stop or prevent mass atrocities.”).
63.  U.N. Charter, art. 52, ¶ 1. 
64. Id. art. 53, ¶ 1. 
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1. Trans-Atlantic Cooperation: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO was established in 1949, relatively soon after the UN Charter 
was adopted.65  This “Atlantic Alliance” between Western Europe and 
the United States was intended to deter the expansion of the Soviet
Union, prevent the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe, and to 
provide a foundation for collective security.66  Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty establishes the collective self-defense of its members, 
which includes the obligation of members to respond militarily when an
attack on another member occurs.67  Through its permanent military
command structure,68 NATO has undertaken operations sanctioned by
the Security Council and provided support for other UN operations.69 
The UN allowed NATO to lead an intervention in the Balkans during the
1990’s70 and gave NATO control of all military operations during the
2011 intervention in Libya.71  In 2010, NATO committed to working 
more closely with the UN and European Union to prevent crises, manage
conflicts, and stabilize post-conflict situations around the world.72
 2. The European Union (EU) and NATO: Relations and Agreements 
The states of Europe view the Atlantic Alliance and NATO as the 
basis of their collective defense.73  The demise of the Soviet Union brought 
65. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949. A Short History of
NATO, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2013).  The United Nations Charter was signed on June 26, 1945, and came into 
force on October 24, 1945. UNITED NATIONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Introductory
Note, available at https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/intro.shtml.
66. A Short History of NATO, supra note 65. 
67.  North Atlantic Treaty, art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. 
68. Military Organization and Structures, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., http://www.nato. 
int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49608.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
69. NATO’s Relations with the United Nations, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50321.htm?selectedLocale=en (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
70. Henkin, supra note 24, at 826 (“The NATO action in Kosovo had the support 
of the Security Council.  Twelve (out of fifteen) members of the Council voted to reject 
the Russian resolution of March 26, thereby agreeing in effect that the NATO intervention 
had been called for and should continue.  And on June 10, the Security Council, in
Resolution 1244 approving the Kosovo settlement, effectively ratified the NATO action
and gave it the Council’s support.”). 
71. Operational Media Update: NATO and Libya, N. ATL. TREATY ORG. (Oct. 25,
2011) http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_71994.htm.
 72. NATO’s Relations with the United Nations, supra note 69. 
73. OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, SECURING BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY:
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND SECURITY REVIEW, Oct. 2010, Cm. 7948, ¶ 5.11 (U.K.) 
[hereinafter UK SDSR]; Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale [White Paper
on Defense and National Security], PRÉSIDENCE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE, at 23 (June 2008),
http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/information/les_dossiers_actualites_
390
GRAMYK FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2018 4:59 PM       
 
















   
   












[VOL. 15:  377, 2014] Increased Franco-British Military Cooperation 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
an increased sense of security within Europe, but also presented new 
security challenges including terrorism, failed states, and humanitarian
and environmental crises.  In responding to these new threats, the EU 
has emerged as a stronger advocate for multinational cooperation.  The
EU must further develop its defense capabilities separately from those of 
the U.S. in order to act autonomously in response to conflict or threats. 
Increased European military capabilities are intended to complement the 
capabilities of NATO, particularly because of the overlap in membership.74 
The American view of European capabilities has changed from concern
about the “three D’s” (decoupling [of Europe from NATO], duplication 
[of NATO capabilities], discrimination [of non-EU members of NATO]), to
support of Europe’s pursuit of the “three C’s” (“capabilities, capabilities,
capabilities”).75  EU officials have taken steps to emphasize the continuing 
importance to Europe of NATO and the U.S. in this ever-changing security
context. When the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, Javier Solana, addressed the Foreign Policy Association
in New York in 2003, he emphasized both the role of the transatlantic 
alliance in the new security context and the importance of Europe’s more 
equal and capable participation in the alliance:
Today, we work together through conviction more than through geo-political 
necessity. . . . It is a partnership of democracies, for democracy.  We are no
longer a partnership against something, but a partnership for something. Our
common mission is to defend and expand the boundaries of a stable, durable and
peaceful liberal democracy; to share with others the rights and opportunities that 
we enjoy. . . . Many of the things that the United States wants from Europe can 
be better delivered through the European Union. . . . For it was President Bush 
who said in Berlin “When Europe grows in unity, Europe and America grow in
security.”76 
19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/index.html, available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?id=156934 [English translation] [hereinafter French White Paper 
2008]. 
74. Twenty-one countries are members of both the European Union and NATO, 
and European countries comprise most of the membership of NATO.  John Barry, The 
U.S.-EU-NATO Relationship–Addressing 21st Century Challenges, Archive to European
Affairs, THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTE, (Feb. 2012), http://www.europeaninstitute.org/EA­
February-2012/the-us-eu-nato-relationship-addressing-21st-century-challenges.html. 
75. Id.
76. Javier Solana, High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Sec. 
Policy (CFSP), Speech at the Annual Dinner of the Foreign Policy Association: Europe 
and America: Partners of Choice (May 7, 2003), available at http://www.eu-un.europa.
eu/articles/en/article_2316_en.htm. 
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Europe’s desire to play a greater role on the international security 
stage has also led to new arrangements that have shifted Europe’s role 
within the NATO alliance. The Berlin Plus agreement between the EU 
and NATO allows for autonomous EU action using NATO assets and 
capabilities where (1) there is consensus in the EU and (2) no NATO 
action.77  The permanent relations framework between the EU and NATO 
requires transparency and discussion in order to promote efficient and rapid
decision making within both organizations.78  NATO’s 2010 Strategic
Concept recognizes the benefits of the increase in European capabilities.79 
It calls for closer cooperation between the EU and NATO in “operations
throughout the crisis spectrum” and in capabilities development, in order to
prevent duplication and promote cost-effectiveness.80  European defense
capabilities will allow for more equal participation within the alliance, a 
factor that can quell allies’ concerns about costs and potential actions. 
Developing balanced European capabilities is the next challenge for the EU. 
Just as capabilities and costs must be balanced between NATO members, 
they must also be balanced within the EU. 
B. Military Cooperation in the European Union 
1. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union
Each European Union treaty has brought the members of the EU closer 
together. The Maastricht Treaty first launched the European Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which necessarily requires coordinated 
external civilian and military capabilities.81  In pursuit of a common policy,
the EU has developed additional guiding principles and goals. The
European Security Strategy (ESS), developed in 2003, identifies the key
threats facing Europe, which include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of
 77. Barry, The U.S.-EU-NATO Relationship, supra note 74; EUROPEAN COUNCIL, 
Background on EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus
(last visited Feb. 22, 2013), http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20 
Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf (explaining that this framework was put
into action during Operation CONCORDIA in Macedonia.). 
78. EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus, supra
note 77, ¶ 3. 
79. See generally Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the 
Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, N. ATL.
TREATY ORG. (Nov. 19–20, 2010), available at http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/
Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf. 
80. NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/ 
en/natolive/topics_49217.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
81. EUROPA, Summaries of EU Legislation: Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en. 
htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
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mass destruction, regional conflict, state failure, and organized crime.82  The 
EU thus aims to more actively pursue its strategic objectives, be more
capable of acting, establish more coherent policy and action, and act
more in concert with other states.83  The Petersberg Tasks, first outlined in
1992 by the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union,84 became
a part of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) with the 1997 Treaty 
of Amsterdam.85  According to Article 43 of the TEU, the EU may use
civilian or military capabilities to complete these tasks, which include: joint 
disarmament operations; humanitarian and rescue; military advice and
assistance; conflict prevention and peacekeeping; and combat
forces in crisis management (including peace-making and post-
conflict stabilization).86 
The EU has tried to further this vision of closer cooperation and
coordination between Member States by bringing national representatives 
together in new agencies and creating new posts at the supranational 
level to supervise such coordination.  The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 created
the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, responsible for the coordination of all forms of the EU’s 
foreign policy—traditional diplomacy as well as economic and military
tools.87  The Member States have established agencies within the EU to 
oversee the further coordination of military and defense capabilities.
The European Defense Agency (EDA), for example, is intended to act as 
the ultimate coordinator for the development of defense capabilities and
military harmonization and cooperation within the EU.88  The Military 
Committee of the EU, which is the highest military body within the 
82. EUROPEAN COUNCIL, European Security Strategy, 3–4 (Dec. 12, 2003), http://
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf [hereinafter European Security Strategy].
83. Id. at 11–13. 
84. EUROPA, Summaries of EU Legislation: Petersberg Tasks, http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
85. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 
O.J. (C 340) 108. 
86. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union art. 43, Mar. 30, 
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter Treaty on the European Union]. 
87. EUROPA, European Union External Action Service, http://eeas.europa.eu/what_ 
we_do/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
88. EUROPEAN DEF. AGENCY, Mission and Functions, http://www.eda.europa.eu/ 
Aboutus/Whatwedo/Missionandfunctions (last visited Feb. 22, 2013); Council Decision 
2011/411/CFSP, Defining the Statute, Seat and Operational Rules of the European Defence 
Agency, 2011 O.J. (L 183) 16; Treaty on the European Union, supra note 86, art. 45. 
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European Council, brings together the Chiefs of Defense of each Member
State to give military advice and recommend action to other EU agencies.89 
The EU Member States recognized that in order to successfully perform
the Petersberg tasks and other international operations, a rapid response 
force was required.  The Helsinki Headline Goal of 199990 and the Headline
Goal 201091 were established with the goal of developing the EU’s rapid
response capabilities.92  A proposed Battlegroup Concept reached full
operational capability in January 2007, giving the EU the ability to 
undertake two separate rapid response operations nearly simultaneously.93 
A Battlegroup is “the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly
deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or 
for the initial phase of larger operations.”94  Battlegroups give the EU a 
means of being more coherent, active, and capable in undertaking the
Petersberg tasks and promoting the synchronization and harmonization 
of European military capabilities.95  Although the Battlegroup concept is 
fully operational, no EU Battlegroup has been deployed and the current
economic climate has resulted in fewer Battlegroups on standby.96 
Therefore, while the EU’s rapid response is operational, it does not 
89. Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP, Setting Up the Military Committee of the 
European Union, 2001 O.J. (L 27) 4–5. 
90. The Helsinki Headline Goal set a goal date of 2003 for the EU to be able to 
rapidly deploy and sustain operations in support of the full range of Petersberg tasks. 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL, Helsinki Headline Goal (1999), available at https://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Helsinki%20Headline%20Goal.pdf. 
91. The 2010 Headline Goal was developed after the European Security Strategy
was adopted.  It was prepared after the completion of EU-led operations, the most
important of which was operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, EU Battlegroups, at 1 (July 2009), http://www.consilium. 
europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090720-Factsheet-Battlegroups_EN.pdf.  The 2010 HG was 
therefore able to realistically address Europe’s strengths and weaknesses.  EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL, Headline Goal 2010, at 5 (June 18, 2004), http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/
2010%20Headline%20Goal.pdf. 
92. Headline Goal 2010, supra note 91, at 3. 
93. EU Battlegroups, supra note 91, at 1. 
94. Id. at 2.  Composed of about 1500 personnel, a Battlegroup (BG) may be formed 
by a multinational coalition or a single framework nation.  A BG is intended to be deployable
within five days, and sustainable for thirty days (or up to 120 days if re-supplied). Id.
 95. Id. at 4. 
 96. Myrto Hatzigeorgopoulos, EU Battlegroups – battling irrelevance?, INT’L SEC.
INFO. SERV. EUR. (ISIS EUROPE) (July 7, 2012), http://isiseurope.wordpress.com/2012/07/04/ 
eu-battlegroups-battling-irrelevance/.  For further reading on EU Battlegroups, see 
Claudia Major & Christian Mölling, EU Battlegroups: What Contribution to European 
Defence?, GER. INST. FOR INT’L AND SEC. AFF. (SWP) (June 2011), http://www.swp­
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2011_RP08_mjr_mlg_ks.pdf; Gustav 
Lindstrom, Enter the EU Battlegroups, Chaillot Paper n. 97 (Feb. 2007), INST. FOR SEC.
STUD. (EUISS), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp097.pdf. 
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provide the full ability to act that European states, including the UK and
France, desire. 
2. 	The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid: Guidelines for 
Humanitarian Aid and Intervention 
The EU issued the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid in 2008 
in response to the 2003 European Security Strategy’s identification of 
humanitarian issues as a potential security threat.97  The document clearly 
expresses the European commitment to humanitarian values, both at the 
Member State and European Community level.  The document articulates
the EU’s recognition of the moral imperative of providing humanitarian
aid,98 its commitment to follow the “responsibility to protect” as adopted by
the UN General Assembly in 2005,99 and the necessity for it to work 
cooperatively with other humanitarian aid donors and organizations.100 
The EU intends to use military assets “only . . . as a ‘last resort’, i.e. where 
there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military assets 
that are unique in capability and availability can meet a critical humanitarian 
need.”101  The EU approach mirrors that of the UN and other organizations
by calling for non-military options to be exercised and exhausted first. 
C. 	Previous Attempts by France and the United Kingdom to Develop 
and Integrate European Defense 
As the EU has become increasingly integrated, France and the UK 
have emerged as leaders, acting to implement each new facet of cooperation,
particularly in the area of military cooperation.  Both countries are among 
the biggest spenders on defense, not just in the EU, but in the world.102 
97. Joint Declarations by the Council and the Representatives of the Governments 
of Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Commission, The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, 2008 O.J. (C 25) 
1, [hereinafter The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid]. 
98. Id. ¶ 1
99. Id. ¶ 17. 
100. Id. ¶ 4.
101. Id. ¶ 61. 
102. STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST., Military Spending and Armament: The
15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2011 (table) (2011), available at
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex_15/the-15-countries-with­
the-highest-military-expenditure-in-2011-table/view.  The UK spent 2.6% of its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) on defense in 2011, while France spent 2.3% of its GDP on defense 
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They also have similar desires to project power globally.103  By recognizing 
their similarities and bringing together their strengths, the two may increase 
their collective and individual impact on the global stage. 
1. 	The Saint Malo Agreement, European Common Security, and the 
2003 Invasion of Iraq
The first steps to increase practical military cooperation between France 
and the UK occurred in 1998, after the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. A
cooperative military agreement was signed by the two states in Saint
Malo, France, in December 1998.104  That Agreement called for Europe
to develop “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so,
in order to respond to international crises.”105  The Agreement focused on 
cooperation in intelligence, strategic planning, technology, and military
forces,106 capabilities intended to lessen European reliance on U.S. forces
and give the EU a means of acting where NATO did not.107 
Saint Malo was a bilateral agreement, yet it contemplated the participation 
of all European states in the development of such defense capabilities 
and organizations. The Agreement had immediate political impact. The
EU launched the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999,108 
which later became the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of
the EU.109  The development of CSDP, which is organized within the EU
structure under the umbrella of the European Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), was followed by the drafting of the European Security
in the same year. Id.  Both countries spent approximately the same percentage of GDP on
defense in 2012 (UK 2.5%; France 2.3%).  STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST., Military
Spending and Armament: The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2012
(table) (2012), available at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/ Top%2015%20
table%202012.pdf. 
103. Defense Report: The French-British Defense Treaty: Setting History Aside?, 
ASS’N OF THE U.S. ARMY INST. OF LAND WARFARE (ILW) 1 (Jan. 2011), http://www.ausa.
org/publications/ilw/Documents/DR%2011-1_LOWRES.pdf. 
104. UK Politics: Anglo-French Military Pact, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 1998), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/227598.stm.
105. British–French Summit, St-Malo, 3–4 December 1998 Joint Declaration on
European Defense, in FROM ST-MALO TO NICE: EUROPEAN DEFENCE: CORE DOCUMENTS, 
Chaillot Paper n. 47, 8, ¶ 2, INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (WESTERN E.U.) (May 2001), http:// 
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp047e.pdf [hereinafter St. Malo Declaration]. 
106. Id. ¶ 3–4. 
107. Id. ¶ 2–3. 
108. Daniel Keohane, 10 Years After St. Malo, E.U. INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (EUISS)
(Oct. 10, 2008), http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/10-years-after-st-malo/. 
109. Topics: CSDP: Overview, E.U. INST. OF SEC. STUD. (EUISS), http://www.iss.
europa.eu/topics/security-and-defence (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). 
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Strategy in 2003.110  France and the UK had successfully initiated the
process of integrating European defense. 
However, while the majority of European states continued to display 
the political will to integrate further, national interests began to divide 
the UK and France.  Ultimately, the most significant fracture occurred
over the issue of support for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Security Council Resolution 1441, which called for Iraq to fulfill its 
disarmament obligations and to allow inspection for weapons of mass 
destruction, was unanimously adopted.111  However, France and the UK
disagreed on the best response to Iraq’s material breach of its obligation 
to disarm.  France, along with Russia and China, opposed the inclusion 
of an authorization for use of force in Resolution 1441, and went so far 
as to write an alternative draft resolution that proposed a two-step process to
ensure Iraq’s compliance.112  Conversely, the UK and the United States
opposed any limitation on the ability to use force against Iraq, though 
both states asserted that the Security Council should reassess the 
situation if Iraqi non-compliance continued.113  France was willing to 
authorize military intervention, but only in limited circumstances,114 and 
then only as a last resort.115  French President Jacques Chirac was “deeply 
opposed” to any military action,116 while British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair agreed with U.S. President George Bush that Security Council support 
for an invasion was unnecessary.117  The security interests of France and 
the UK continued to be aligned, while their national leaders differed
significantly on the best approach to the Iraq case—military intervention 
or continued diplomacy—to preserve security. 
110.  European Security Strategy, supra note 82. 
111. Tim Youngs & Paul Bowers, Iraq and UN Security Council Resolution 1441, 
HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, INT’L AFFAIRS AND DEF. SECTION, Research Paper 02/64,
at 14 (Nov. 21, 2002) (U.K.), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/
research/rp2002/rp02-064.pdf. 
112. Id. at 12, 17, 22. 
113. Id. at 22–23. 
114. Id. at 25. 
115. Robin Oakley, Crucial France, UK Talks Over Iraq, CNN WORLD, Feb. 3, 
2003, http://articles.cnn.com/2003-02-03/world/france.uk.iraq.meeting_1_military-action-le­
touquet-french-president-jacques-chirac?_s=PM:Europe. 
116. Iraq inquiry told France saw invasion as ‘dangerous’, BBC NEWS, June 29, 
2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10437254. 
117. Iraq inquiry hears defiant Blair say: I’d do it again, BBC NEWS, Jan. 29, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8485694.stm.
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2. The 2003 Franco-British Summits and the Continued Push for 
European Defense Development and Integration
Despite the huge differences in opinion regarding the invasion of Iraq, 
the UK and France continued to press forward in the military cooperation 
arena and encourage the development of European defense capabilities.
In February 2003, at a joint summit in Le Touquet, France, the two powers 
agreed to give new force to the defense policy of Europe.118  The Le 
Touquet Declaration praised the advancements in European common
security policy, but advocated for further growth of the policy to correspond 
with contemporary challenges, notably in three areas.119  First, they
desired an increased role for the EU in crisis management, specifically in 
the Balkans and Africa.120  The Declaration asserted that the scope of 
ESDP should match the global ambitions of the EU and it should function
in support of the EU’s external policy objectives to promote democracy,
human rights, good governance, and reform.121  Secondly, the two states
sought increased European solidarity in response to threats to common
security. France and the UK also called for a solidarity clause to be inserted 
into the Treaty of the European Union, which asserted that neither party
could “imagine a situation in which the vital interests of one . . . could be 
threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.”122 
Finally, the two powers again affirmed the need for EU Member States
to develop military capabilities.  The Declaration called for the EU to draft 
new capability objectives to replace the Helsinki Headline Goal, create an
agency to oversee capabilities development and acquisition throughout
the EU, organize EU rapid response forces, develop interoperable aircraft 
carrier groups, and continue development of bilateral naval cooperation.123 
By the end of 2003, several of the Le Touquet goals were well on the 
way to completion.  By that time, the EU had drafted a new security
strategy;124 achieved the Helsinki Headline Goal;125 agreed to create an 
118. Franco-British Summit - Declaration on Strengthening European Cooperation 
in Security and Defence, Le Touquet, 4 February 4, 2003, in From Copenhagen to Brussels:
European Defence: Core Documents Volume IV, Chaillot Paper n. 67, 36, 36–39, E.U. 
INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (EUISS) (Dec. 2003), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ 
cp067e.pdf [hereinafter Le Touquet Declaration]. 
Brussels, 5 November 2003, in From Copenhagen to Brussels: European Defence: Core 
119. Id. at 36. 
120. Id. at 37. 
121. Id.
 122. Id. at 38. 
123. Id. at 38–39. 
124. 
125. 
 European Security Strategy, supra note 82.
Intervention by Javier Solana at the Meeting of EU Chiefs of Defence Staff,
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EU-level agency to oversee defense capabilities development, research,
and acquisition;126 established the “Berlin Plus” permanent relations with 
NATO;127 and launched or completed a total of three ESDP operations.128 
During a November 2003 Franco-British summit in London, the 
two countries applauded the progress.129 Both states participated in the
successful ESDP operations by committing their military capabilities to
the operations and France played the role of the framework nation in 
several operations.130  The November 2003 London Declaration established 
new benchmarks to strengthen European defense capabilities, particularly
the acquisition of strategic lift and cooperation in the naval field, and 
reemphasized the need to develop EU rapid response capabilities to
allow EU participation in UN crisis management operations.131  In 2004, 
the UK and France, together with Germany, proposed the concept for 
Battlegroups that was later adopted by the EU and incorporated into the 
2010 Headline Goal.132  The three states also collaborated on a proposal
for planning EU-led military operations, involving liaison with NATO 
and a system of national and multinational headquarters.133  In cases
Documents Volume IV, Chaillot Paper n.67, 250, 250, E.U. INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (EUISS) 
(Dec. 2003), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp067e.pdf. 
126. General Affairs and External Relations Council, Brussels, 17 November 2003, 
in From Copenhagen to Brussels: European Defence: Core Documents Volume IV, 
Chaillot Paper n.67, 256, 261, E.U. INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (EUISS) (Nov. 2003), http://
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp067e.pdf. 
127. General Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting with EU Defence 
Ministers, Brussels, 17 November  2003, in From Copenhagen to Brussels: European 
Defence: Core Documents Volume IV, Chaillot Paper n. 67, 273, 273, E.U. INST. FOR
SEC. STUD. (EUISS) (Dec. 2003), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp067e.pdf. 
128. Id. These operations were: EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Operations
CONCORDIA and EUPOL PROXIMA in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 
and Operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Id.
129. Franco-British Summit Declaration on Strengthening European Cooperation 
in Security and Defence, London, 24 November 2003, in From Copenhagen to Brussels:
European Defence: Core Documents Volume IV, Chaillot Paper n. 67, 280, E.U. INST.
FOR SEC. STUD. (EUISS) (Dec. 2003), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp067e.pdf. 
130. Id. at 280–82. France served as framework nation for Operations ARTEMIS 
and CONCORDIA. Id.
 131. Id. at 281–82. 
132. The Battlegroups Concept – UK/France/Germany Food for Thought Paper,
Brussels, 10 February 2004, in EU Security and Defense: Core Documents 2004 Volume 
V, Chaillot Paper n.75, 10, 10, E.U. INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (EUISS) (Feb. 2005), http:// 
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp075e.pdf. 
133. Joint Paper on European Defence by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,
Naples, 29 November 2003, in From Copenhagen to Brussels: European Defence: Core
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where the UK and France have led, the EU has willingly followed.  As
the defense leaders of Europe, both states have seen European defense
capabilities as a method to increase security while lessening the burden 
on themselves. 




As two of the largest military powers in Europe, promoting military
cooperation and integration sufficient to prevent duplication of capabilities 
throughout European states has served the interests of both France and
the UK.  Both countries agree that strengthened European defense 
capabilities benefit NATO because it reduces European reliance on the 
United States for its collective defense. 
The UK has always placed great value on its security and defense
relationship with the U.S. and NATO, and continually reiterates this 
westward orientation, calling the latter the “bedrock of our defense.”134 
France, however, does not share the same transatlantic focus as the UK,
but instead believes in European security and defense.  In 1966, French 
President Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from the NATO integrated
command structure because of U.S. dominance in the organization.135 
This exit was finally reversed in 2009 at the direction of President Sarkozy,
who viewed French participation in NATO as a means to ensure France’s
global political power.136  During its period outside of the integrated
command structures, France could not exercise an influence on NATO
proportional to its contributions.137  Its efforts to promote and encourage 
further European defense integration were often met with suspicion by 
its European partners, who viewed these efforts instead as attempts to 
undermine NATO.138  The shifting global security context and the
emergence of new threats has caused France and the UK to place greater
value on increased bilateral cooperation, especially as a means to ensure 
security and increase global influence. 
Documents Volume IV, Chaillot Paper n.67, 283, 283–84 E.U. INST. FOR SEC. STUD.
(EUISS) (Dec. 2003), http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp067e.pdf. 
134. UK SDSR, supra note 73, at 62 ¶ 5.11. 
135. Q&A: France and NATO, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/europe/7938191.stm. 
136. France ends four-decade NATO rift, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2009), http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7937666.stm. 
137. Anne-Henry de Russé, France’s Return Into NATO: French Military Culture 
and Strategic Identity in Question, Focus stratégique No. 22 bis, at 21, INSTITUTE FRANÇAIS 
DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES (IFRI) LABORATOIRE DE RECHERCHE SUR LA DÉFENSE, 
at 21 (Oct. 2010), http://www.ifri.org/downloads/fs22bisderusse.pdf. 
138. Id.
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A. Why Now? Changing Strategic Contexts and the Continuation of 

Previous Cooperation Agreements 

1. International and Economic Contexts 

While the U.S. has traditionally focused on the European security 
relationship, its strategic focus has shifted in recent years to the Asia-
Pacific region.  During a November 2011 speech to the Australian 
Parliament, U.S. President Barack Obama announced his decision to
increase the U.S. role in the Asia-Pacific, even at the expense of U.S. 
military capabilities in other regions.139 The U.S. intends to refocus its
national strategy to the Asia-Pacific region,140 by increasing its military 
presence and engaging in military and diplomatic cooperation with other 
states in the region.141  This policy shift is confirmed by the relocation of
U.S. naval, air, and land forces to the region,142 and bilateral agreements
to deepen military and diplomatic cooperation with Pacific states,
particularly Australia.143 
139. Barack Obama, President of the U. S., Remarks to the Australian Parliament 
(Nov. 17, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/ 
11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament) (“Our new focus on this region 
reflects a fundamental truth—the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific 
nation . . .  As President, I have, therefore, made a deliberate and strategic decision—as a
Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this 
region and its future . . . As the United States puts our fiscal house in order, we are reducing
our spending.  And, yes . . . we will make some reductions in defense spending . . . I have 
directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific
a top priority. As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not—I repeat, will
not—come at the expense of the Asia Pacific.”).
140. Donna Miles, Pacom: Asia-Pacific Focus Represents ‘Whole of Government’ 
Rebalance, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www. 
defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117399. 
141. Tyrone C. Marshall, Jr., Pentagon Official Explains Asia-Pacific Focus, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=117989.  The U.S. goal for 2020 is for sixty percent of U.S. naval 
assets to be based in the Pacific. Id.
 142. Donna Miles, Obama Announces Expanded U.S. Military Presence in Australia, 
AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/
news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66098. In 2011, the U.S. and Australia came to an agreement 
to deploy companies of U.S. Marines to Australia’s Northern Territory and to allow 
increased U.S. use of Australian air bases. Id.
 143. Cheryl Pellerin, U.S.-Australia Alliance Bolsters Regional Security, Prosperity, 
AM. FORCES PRESS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/
newsarticle.aspx?id=118535.  In 2012, the two countries announced plans to relocate 
several U.S. space systems to Australia, representing what U.S. Defense Secretary Leon 
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U.S. officials have overcome an initial reluctance to promote separate 
European defense capabilities and now see the development of such as 
necessary.  During a 2011 speech in Brussels, then-U.S. Defense Secretary
Robert Gates questioned the future of NATO if European nations did not
begin to be “responsible for their fair share of the common defense”: 
The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S.
Congress—and in the American body politic writ large—to expend increasingly
precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the 
necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable
partners in their own defense. . . . Indeed, if current trends in the decline of
European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political
leaders—those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it
was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO 
worth the cost.144 
On all sides of the European security equation are budgetary concerns, 
particularly amid the global economic downturn that began in 2008, as 
European states implement austerity measures and slash military budgets.145 
Military expenditure has never been a large part of European budgets. 
Even though Europe accounts for one-third of global military spending 
exclusive of U.S. military spending,146 few European states meet the NATO
standard of spending 2 percent of GDP on military and defense.147 
Austerity measures, implemented in every European country, compound 
the traditional lack of European defense spending and capabilities, and
will severely affect the future of European defense capabilities.148 
Panetta referred to as “a major leap forward in bilateral space cooperation and an important 
new frontier in the United States’ rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.” Id.
144. Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Speech to the Security and Defense 
Agenda (Future of NATO) (June10, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.defense. 
gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581) [hereinafter Gates Speech].
145. Marko Savković, Europe’s Defence in Times of Austerity: Spending Cuts as a 
One-Way Street?, BELGRADE CENTRE FOR SECURITY POL. (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.isn.
ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=154133. 
146. EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, EUROPEAN DEFENCE CAPABILITIES: LESSONS 
FROM THE PAST, SIGNPOSTS FOR THE FUTURE, 2010–12, H.L. 292, ¶ 6 (U.K.) [hereinafter
H.L. 292]. 
147. Gates Speech, supra note 144 (“Today, just five of twenty-eight allies—the U.S., 
U.K., France, Greece, along with Albania—exceed the agreed two percent of GDP 
spending on defense.”); see Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org., Pub. Diplomacy Div., Financial 
and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, tbl.1, PR/CP(2012)047 (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_04/20120413_PR_CP_2012_047_re
v1.pdf; see also H.L. 292, supra note 146, at 20 fig.2. 
148. H.L. 292, supra note 146, ¶ 10 (“Following the financial crisis of 2008 all 
European nations have public expenditure challenges with their exchequers under pressure to
reduce public programmes. The recent fiscal compact treaty signed by 25 Member States will
compound this for some time. Without a near and present external threat, EU Member
States will not give defence budgets preference. The dominant defence powers in Europe— 
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The UK and France, the de facto European defense leaders, are well
aware of the impact a reduction in U.S. regional focus will have on 
European security. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, both
countries have attempted to encourage the development of European 
capabilities and model effective security cooperation.  France and the UK
believe that such a model of cooperation is necessary so that they, like 
the U.S. before them, do not become the sole providers of European 
defense. 
The security threats that have arisen in the decades after the Cold War
are neither clear nor predictable.  These threats include terrorism, cyber 
terror, environmental change, energy security, and humanitarian crises.
This changing security context to which Europe must respond is mix of
economic concerns, changing threats, humanitarian crises, and shifting 
alliances, which requires varied exercises of “hard power” (military) and 
“soft power” (economic and diplomatic) capabilities.  Europe must build 
its “hard power” to complement its existing “soft power” capabilities and 
replace American military power in the European security and defense 
equation.
Collective defense has been a hallmark of the international community
in the post-WWII era. The UN Charter and the NATO alliance both call 
for implementing collective response to various kinds of threats.149 For
decades, NATO guarantees have provided the basis of Europe’s security
while the states of the EU have also consistently drawn closer in response to
threats. The UK and France governments are acutely aware of their role 
in European defense and the potential impact on the both states’ treaty
obligations of greater bilateral cooperation.150  Since the mid-1990’s, both 
countries have increasingly reframed their security in terms of the broader
collective security of the EU.  The 2010 Treaty for Defence and Security
Co-Operation (2010 Treaty)151 continues this trend by explicitly stating 
that neither could envision “situations arising in which the vital interest
France and the UK—have undertaken major defence reviews and reduced their own
defence budgets respectively by around 3.7% of planned expenditure for 2011-2013 and
7.5% over the next five years from 2011.”). 
149.  U.N. Charter, art. 51; North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 67, art. 5. 
150. See Press Release, Prime Ministers Office, United Kingdom–France Summit
2010 Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation, ¶¶ 1–7, (Nov. 2, 2010), 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/uk%E2%80%93france-summit-2010-declaration-on­
defence-and-security-co-operation/ [hereinafter UK-France 2010 Summit Declaration on
Defence and Security Co-operation]. 
151.  2010 Defense and Security Treaty, supra note 2.
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of either Party could be threatened without the vital interests of the other 
also being threatened,”152 language which was also used, for example, in
the 1995153 and 2003 Joint Declarations.154  The 2010 Treaty, like the
previous agreements, is intended to lead Europe by example in the field
of defense and security cooperation,155 but its provisions diverge from the
prior arrangements by providing for specific bilateral arrangements
to greatly benefit France and the UK on a national level. 
2. National Contexts: Expanding and Converging Views of 
 National Security and Defense 
Both France and the UK have recently reviewed their national security 
and defense and identified key domestic defense objectives.  Each security
strategy expresses the intent to increase defense capabilities, prevent or 
intervene in international crises, and work multilaterally while retaining 
sovereignty and the ability to act unilaterally. 
a. The 2008 French White Paper 
France issued a White Paper on Defence and National Security in 
2008,156 the first official update to national defense policy in fifteen years.157 
It reframed France’s national security strategy to operate on a global basis, 
rather than solely domestic,158 and was designed to “provide responses to 
152. Id. at pmbl.
153. Martin Butscher et al., Nuclear Futures: Western European Options for
Nuclear Risk Reduction, Basic Research Report 98.5, BRITISH AMERICAN SEC. INFO.
COUNCIL, ¶ 4.3 (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.bits.de/public/pdf/rr98-5.pdf
(quoting the Franco-British Joint Statement on Nuclear Co-operation: “We do not see 
situations arising in which the vital interests of either France or the United Kingdom 
could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.”).
154. Le Touquet Declaration, supra note 118, at 38 (“We reaffirm today the 
commitment made in 1995 that we cannot imagine a situation in which the vital interest 
of one of our two countries—France and the UK—could be threatened without the vital 
interests of the other also being threatened.”).
155. Government Response to the House of Lords European Union Committee HL 
292, ¶ 156, MINISTRY OF DEF. (July 5, 2012), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords­
committees/eu-sub-com-c/EUMilitaryCapabilities/MilitaryCapabilitiesGovtResponse.pdf 
[hereinafter Government Response to H.L. 292] (“The UK and France continue to bear a 
disproportionately large share of the burden of European defence and security . . . the 
only real prospect of improved burden sharing . . . lies in more effective collaboration
between groups of Member States with common strategic interest and military cultures . . . In
this respect the UK and France aim to lead by example through their cooperation under 
the treaties.”).
156.  French White Paper 2008, supra note 73. 
157. Id. at 9. 
158. Id. at 15–16. 
404
GRAMYK FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/26/2018 4:59 PM       
 































   
  
 
[VOL. 15:  377, 2014] Increased Franco-British Military Cooperation 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
‘all the risks and threats which could endanger the life of the Nation.’”159 
With the intent to increase France’s freedom of military action,160 the
White Paper sets out five strategic functions of the new security and 
military strategy: knowledge and anticipation, prevention, deterrence,
protection, and intervention.161  It also identifies key strategic threats in 
the evolving global security climate, including transnational and cyber 
terror; nuclear proliferation; espionage; transnational crime; and health 
and environmental risks.162  Finally, it distinguishes four strategic geographic
regions—the Middle East and North Africa (the region stretching from 
the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean), Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe,
and Asia (particularly South and East Asia)—with major implications for
the security of France and Europe.163 
Central to the security strategy is multilateral action for collective 
defense and protection of peace and security.  The document emphasizes
France’s “European ambition,” with the following statement, “[m]aking
the European Union a major player in crisis management and international
security is one of the central tenets of our security policy.”164  France
wants to be a leading power within a strong, capable Europe.  The White 
Paper advocates the drafting of a complementary European defense
strategy and calls for Europe to prioritize capability expansion and crisis
management.165  Although it further advocates a “renovation of Transatlantic
relations” and a French return to the NATO command structures166 (a
move finally undertaken by French President Sarkozy in 2009167), it still
stresses the continued importance of de Gaullian defense principles in
this rapprochement with NATO.168  French policy makers considered a
 159. Id. at 301. 
160. Id. at 69. 
161. Id. at 60–69. 
162. Id. at 47–54. 
163. Id. at 41–47. 
164. 
165. 
Id. at 303; see generally id. at Ch. 4.
Id. at 82–85. 
166. See id. at Ch. 5.  The White Paper calls for the composition of a ‘European 
White Paper’ on Defense. Id. at 91.
 167. France ends four-decade NATO rift, BBC NEWS, supra note 136. 
168. French White Paper 2008, supra note 73, at 101–04, 304. The renovation of
French participation in NATO must adhere to the three principles of French defense,
outlined by former President Charles de Gaulle: that France retain full freedom of 
assessment, total nuclear independence, and the full freedom to commit its armed forces
(i.e., no French forces permanently placed under NATO control in times of peace). Id. at 
304. 
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full return to NATO necessary to show support for such an important 
multilateral defense organization and to legitimize France’s ambition to 
lead Europe within and without the NATO structure.169  Finally, the 
White Paper reaffirms France’s commitment to multilateralism as practiced
by the UN and to the protection of human rights through the UN
framework.170 
b. The 2010 UK National Security Strategy Update and Strategic 
Defense and Security Review 
Following France’s security strategy update, the UK began to reevaluate
its national defense strategy in light of new security challenges.  The
2010 Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR), which details how 
the UK will implement the National Security Strategy,171 sets out two 
British defense objectives: 
(i) [T]o ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting our people, economy,
infrastructure, territory and ways of life from all major risks that can affect us
directly; and (ii) to shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of 
risks affecting the UK or our interest overseas, and applying our instruments of
power and influence to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks 
at source.172 
Like the global view of national security espoused in France’s White
Paper, the SDSR expands the definition of “national security” to include
protection from risks that do not directly threaten the territory of the state.173 
In an interconnected, globalized world, states have come to recognize that
threats to national security include more than a direct, armed attack on
the home territory.  They now include transnational and cyber terrorism,
environmental and health threats, and international instability.  The national
security tasks and guidelines outlined by the SDSR focus heavily on the
 169. Id. at 96. 
170. France “[s]upports regional security organisations which will be able to act on
a complementary scale to the United Nations in favour of peace-keeping, disarmament, 
the fight against terrorism, civil security, and conflict prevention.” Livre blanc sur la
défense et la sécurité nationale [White Paper on Defense and National Security], press kit 
(English), PRÉSIDENCE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE, at 36 (Jun. 2008), http://archives.livreblancdefenseet 
securite.gouv.fr/2008/IMG/pdf/white_paper_press_kit.pdf [hereinafter White Paper Press Kit]. 
171. OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, A STRONG BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY:
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, 2010, Cm. 7953 (U.K.) [hereinafter UK National 
Security Strategy]; Press Release, Ministry of Defense, Strategic Defence and Security
Review Published (Oct. 19, 2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/strategic-defence­
and-security-review-published—2. 
172. UK SDSR, supra note 73, ¶ 1.4. 
173.  UK National Security Strategy, supra note 171, pt. 1.
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UK’s ability to prevent and restore international stability.  The SDSR 
identifies, among other goals, the intent to: 
1. 	 Identify and monitor national security risks and opportunities . . . 
2.	 Tackle at root the causes of instability . . .
3. 	 Exert influence to exploit opportunities and manage risks. . . . 
6.	 Help resolve conflicts and contribute to stability.  Where necessary, intervene 
overseas, including the legal use of coercive force in support of the UK’s 
vital interests, and to protect our overseas territories and people. . . . 
8. 	Work in alliances and partnerships wherever possible to generate stronger
responses . . .174 
The SDSR lays out specific steps to achieve these goals ranging from
proposed government programs to increased capabilities, particularly 
intelligence capabilities and naval and air forces.175 In order to achieve
these security goals, the UK must expand its global influence. Such 
expanded global influence requires increased military capabilities.
The SDSR also re-emphasized the UK’s “group-first” orientation,
meaning that the UK will preserve its ability to act alone, but would 
prefer to work multi-nationally—either bilaterally or through an
international, multilateral organization—to achieve or preserve international 
peace and security.176  It identified five priorities within the context of
international cooperation to maintain peace and security: first, the defense
relationship with the U.S.; second, “new models of practical bilateral 
defense and security cooperation with a range of allies and partners”;
third, effective UN action; fourth, NATO; and fifth, “an outward-facing
European Union that promotes security and prosperity.”177  These priorities
complement the British view of engaging in multinational defense to
promote interoperability and efficiency, reduce duplication, permit nations 
to contribute to capabilities they cannot sustain individually, and promote 
unified action.178  Like the White Paper, the SDSR emphasizes the necessity 
for flexibility within the armed forces and distinguishes five types of
operations in order to facilitate planning, deployment, and organization
of forces in support of a range of operations: standing commitments,
174. UK SDSR, supra note 73, at 11–12. 
175. Id.
 176. Id. ¶ 2.10. 
177. Id. ¶ 5.2. 
178. Multinational Defence Co-operation, Policy Paper No. 2, at 5–6, MINISTRY OF
DEF. (Feb. 2001) (U.K.), available at http://gcdi.tripod.com/Publications/UK-polpap2.pdf.
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interventions, stabilization, non-enduring, and enduring.179 The UK must 
turn to Europe as a defense partner in the face of increased European 
integration and U.S. strategic shift away from the region. 
c. Shared Views on Security and Defense 
Both France and the UK recognize the complementary nature of the 
EU and NATO. While non-EU NATO members, particularly the United 
States, were initially hesitant about the development of EU capabilities, 
the EU Member States have made clear their intention to develop
complementary, not competing or duplicative, capabilities.  The White 
Paper declines to strictly define the tasks of each organization and instead 
focuses on the value of each organization in maintaining international 
peace and security: 
NATO is an organisation for collective defence which unites North America
and Europe, in particular when faced with the risk of major aggression.  The
Alliance must also provide a response to the diverse new threats that face the 
allies.  The European Union is unique in that it has the capability of mobilizing
a full range of crisis management tools: military, humanitarian, diplomatic and
financial to serve the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  The EU must not 
be considered as the civilian agency of NATO; it is a full-fledged participant in 
crisis management.180 
The UK Government compared the two organizations in a similar vein
in 2012: “The EU’s CSDP has an increasingly civilian-military focus,
acting where NATO cannot or chooses not to, using its unique set of
comprehensive tools (civilian, military, legal, developmental and financial).
This differing focus should better support the complementarity of
development programmes.”181  This shared view of the overlapping but
complementary nature of the roles of the EU and NATO make France 
and the UK natural partners in defense capability development and
military cooperation.  The push to develop European defense capabilities 
led by these two states is not only a way to relieve some of the defense
 179. UK SDSR, supra note 73, at 18.  Standing commitments are “permanent
operations essential to our security or to support key British interest around the world”; 
intervention operations are “short-term, high-impact military deployments”; stabilization 
operations are “longer-term mainly land-based operations to stabilize and resolve 
conflict situations primarily in support of reconstruction and development and normally
in partnership with others.”  Non-enduring operations last less than six months and 
“typically require[e] a force to be deployed and then withdrawn without replacement,” 
while enduring operations “last for more than six months and normally require units to
carry out a tour of duty and then be replaced by other similar units.” Id.
180.  White Paper Press Kit, supra note 170, at 31. 
181.  Government Response to H.L. 292, supra note 155, ¶ 165. 
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burden on themselves and NATO, but also a way to perform interventions
where NATO support and assistance is not forthcoming. 
Neither the EU nor NATO has established a framework for international 
intervention.  In contrast, France and the UK have individually set out 
guidelines for intervention by their national armed forces.  Both guidelines 
clearly reserve national control of the decision to intervene, retaining such 
sovereign power even when military cooperation occurs.  The commitment
of French forces abroad is governed by the following considerations: 
The seriousness of the threat to our national security or to international peace
and security;
Consideration of other possible measures, prior to the use of armed force, without 
prejudice to the urgency of legitimate defence or the responsibility to protect; 
Respect for the international rule of law;
Sovereign appreciation by the French political authorities, freedom of action,
and the capability to assess the situation at all times; 
Democratic legitimacy, implying transparency regarding the goals and the support of
the nation, notably as expressed by its representatives in Parliament; 
Capacity to commit French forces at a sufficient level, national control of the
deployment of our forces, and a political strategy seeking a lasting settlement to 
the crisis;
Definition of the commitment in time and space, with a precise evaluation of
cost.182 
Similar factors guide the deployment of UK forces:
But we will be more selective in our use of the Armed Forces, deploying them
decisively at the right time but only where key UK national interests are at
stake; where we have a clear strategic aim; where the likely political, economic 
and human costs are in proportion to the likely benefits; where we have a viable 
exit strategy; and where justifiable under international law.183 
The guidelines for intervention established in the ICISS Report—right
authority, just cause to intervene, right intention, last resort, proportional 
means, and reasonable prospects of success184—are all represented in some
manner in each of the UK’s and France’s formulations.  Both sets of 
182.  French White Paper 2008, supra note 73, at 71. 
183. UK SDSR, supra note 73, ¶ 2.10. 
184. ICISS Report, supra note 23, at 32. 
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guidelines assert a primary intention to observe international law.185 
France unambiguously places international peace and security on par
with national security.186  While the UK’s guidelines purport to limit
intervention to instances that threaten national interests,187 the security 
strategy elsewhere expands what constitutes “national interests” to threats 
and further to international peace and security.188  The UK expressly 
requires proportionality and chance of success to be considered,189 while
France relies on the democratic process—including an evaluation of
cost—to ensure that interventions are undertaken with proportional means
and with a reasonable chance of success.190  Both nations intend to
intervene as a last resort.  France requires “other possible measures” to be
explored before resorting to force,191 while Britain’s “justifiable under
international law” standard can be interpreted to include its commitment
under the UN Charter to first attempt pacific resolutions.192  Both nations
have articulated a balancing test to apply within its existing international
commitments.193 
185. French White Paper 2008, supra note 73, at 71 (“Respect for the international
rule of law . . .”); UK SDSR, supra note 73, ¶ 2.10 (“. . . [W]here justifiable under
international law.”).
186. French White Paper 2008, supra note 73, at 71 (“The seriousness of the threat
to our national security or to international peace and security . . .”).
187. UK SDSR, supra note 73, ¶ 2.10 (“[O]nly where key UK national interests are 
at stake . . .”).
188. UK National Security Strategy, supra note 171, ¶ 1.21 (“Globalisation in all
its forms has made the world more interconnected . . . This means that it is much harder
to isolate the UK from shocks occurring outside our own territory, whether they are 
economic or geopolitical.”); UK SDSR, supra note 73, ¶ 1.4 (“The National Security
Strategy sets out two clear objectives . . . (ii) to shape a stable world, by acting to reduce 
the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or our interests overseas, and applying our
instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment and tackle potential 
risks at source.”).
189. UK SDSR, supra note 73, ¶ 2.10 (“[W]here the likely political, economic and
human costs are in proportion to the likely benefits; where we have a viable exit 
strategy . . . .”). 
190. French White Paper 2008, supra note 73, at 71 (“Democratic legitimacy, implying
transparency regarding the goals and the support of the nation, notably as expressed by
its representatives in Parliament; Capacity to commit French forces at a sufficient level,
national control of the deployment of our forces, and a political strategy seeking a lasting
settlement to the crisis; Definition of the commitment in space and time, with a precise
evaluation of the cost.”).
191. Id.; UK SDSR, supra note 73, ¶ 2.10. 
192. UK SDSR, supra note 73, ¶ 2.10. 
193. The recognition of considerations such as use of military force as a last resort 
mirrors the obligations identified in Article 2 of the UN Charter, and The European
Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, supra note 97, ¶ 61. European Security Strategy, supra
note 82, at 7 (emphasizing that no crises may be solved by a purely military approach).
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The R2P doctrine has become an implicit part of the security and 
defense posture of both countries.  France’s inclusion of “the responsibility 
to protect” in its intervention guidelines is strong evidence of an emerging
international norm of interventions applying the R2P doctrine. Recognition
by a major power, able to engage in future interventions and likely to
cite the doctrine as a justification for doing so, gives the concept more 
force than an abstract recognition by the General Assembly, a body that
includes many small nations which cannot lead, much less undertake, an
intervention.  Though the UK’s guidelines do not expressly refer to the 
R2P doctrine, they do require that intervention be “justifiable” under 
international law.  This characterization conceivably incorporates the R2P 
doctrine, just as it has been recognized as a justifiable use of force by the 
UN. Support for the R2P doctrine by states that are willing and able to
undertake interventions gives the doctrine stronger force of law and, in
turn, legitimizes any interventions that apply the doctrine to humanitarian 
crises.
B. Terms of the Treaty 
In 2010, France and the UK (the Parties) signed the Defense and 
Security Co-operation Treaty (2010 Treaty), which entered into force in
2011.194  This Treaty represents the continuing desire of both countries
to encourage military and defense cooperation, but goes farther than any 
previous agreement to achieve interoperability and collaboration. Where 
previous joint agreements and declarations were merely aspirational, the 
2010 Treaty specifies the objectives and scope of the cooperation, including 
a Letter of Intent that identifies specific programs necessary to increase
interoperability and coordination that will be implemented over the next
several years.195 
1. Objectives and Scope
Article 1 clearly defines the purpose of the 2010 Treaty.  The Parties 
reiterate their intent to function within the scope of the UN, NATO, and 
the EU to strengthen the complementary capabilities of NATO and the 
EU.196  The overarching objective of the Treaty is to clearly maximize
194. 
195. 
 2010 Defense and Security Treaty, supra note 2.
Id.
 196. Id. art. 1, ¶ 5.










     
   
 
    
























capabilities by coordinating development, acquisition, and deployment.197 
Through the effective coordination of capabilities, the Parties seek the 
ability to perform “the full spectrum of missions, including the most
demanding missions,”198 and to participate and sustain deployment in
support of UN, NATO, EU, multilateral, or bilateral operations.199 
Additionally, the Parties aim to promote the growth of the defense 
industries in their respective territories, as well as Europe as a whole,200 
and to work together to “ensur[e] the vitality and safety” of the nuclear 
arsenals of both states.201 
While previous joint declarations and agreements, such as the 2003 Le 
Touquet Declaration, did include specific objectives to bring about
greater coordination,202 the 2010 Treaty focuses exclusively on bilateral
cooperation and does not call for any European action in any of the 
objectives set forth in Article 1.  It is not intended to be “Saint Malo II,” 
and function exclusively as a vehicle to promote European coordination.203 
This bilateral Treaty, while accomplishing many of the long-standing 
European defense goals held by the Parties, also provides a great benefit 
by allowing both parties to achieve key national security goals established
in their respective security strategies, and to increase their security and 
defense capabilities while reducing costs and military budgets. 
The scope of the cooperation under the Treaty is set out in Article 2.204 
It includes joint exercises and training activities to facilitate closer 
cooperation of armed forces; exchange of military doctrine and personnel;
pooling of materials, equipment and services; and cooperation in contributing
forces and capabilities to military operations.205  It also promotes cooperation
in procurement and development of capabilities,206 joint building and
operation of facilities,207 and the exchange of personnel,208 policy, and
 197. Id. art. 1, ¶ 1.
198. Id.
 199. Id. art. 1, ¶ 3.
200. Id. art. 1, ¶ 2.
201. Id. art. 1, ¶ 4.
202.  Le Touquet Declaration, supra note 118. 
203. Nick Harvey, UK Minister for the Armed Forces, Speech to the Franco-British
Council Defense Co-operation Conference: Natural Partners, Necessary Partners – UK-
France Defence Co-operation 4 (Mar. 31, 2011) (speaker’s notes available at https://www.
gov.uk/government/speeches/2011-03-31-natural-partners-necessary-partners-uk-francedefence
-co-operation—2) (“This is not St. Malo 2.  This is a bilateral agreement between the
sovereign nations of Britain and France.”).
204.  2010 Defense and Security Treaty, supra note 2.
205. Id. art. 2, ¶ 1.
206. Id. art. 2, ¶ 2.
207. Id. art. 2, ¶ 3. 
208. Id. art. 2, ¶ 6.
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planning information for operations,209 and classified data related to the
performance of defense systems and equipment.210  This Treaty fosters
closer integration of the military forces, capabilities, and intelligence than 
has been seen in previous attempts at international military cooperation. 
While governments traditionally guard military capabilities and intelligence 
jealously as a part of national security, the Parties agreed to deviate from 
the norm to protect the national interest of each state.  As a result of 
economic downturn and other domestic pressures, both governments must 
cut spending on military and defense, while capabilities must be upgraded
and increased to protect national security and expand global influence. 
The contradictory process must be accomplished nearly simultaneously
and thus success is made more likely by sharing the cost with another
state.
2. Composition of the Joint Initiatives 
The general objectives of the 2010 Treaty are accompanied by specific
joint military initiatives.  These joint measures are intended to improve 
defense capabilities while decreasing military expenditures in both
countries.  Central to the expansion and improvement of the land, sea, 
and air forces of both countries is the creation of a Combined Joint
Expeditionary Force (CJEF).  This non-standing bilateral force is intended
to maximize the ability to participate in the full spectrum of missions, in 
support of UN, NATO, EU, and other multilateral or bilateral operations.211 
The CJEF arrangement is expected to foster closer integration in military 
performance and planning, as well as a greater coherence in military
doctrine, training, and equipment requirements.212  Increased cooperation 
between maritime forces is essential for the ability of both countries to
deploy in support of many types of operations.213  Deployment of an
integrated carrier strike group by 2020 will be a crucial step towards the 
209. Id. art. 2, ¶ 7.
210. Id. art. 2, ¶ 8.
211. See Press Release, UK Ministry of Defense, UK-France Defence Co-Operation
Treaty Announced (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/
DefencePolicyAndBusiness/UkfranceDefenceCooperationTreatyAnnounced.htm. 
212. UK-France 2010 Summit Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation, 
supra note 150, ¶ 8. 
213. Id. ¶ 9. Particularly necessary is the compatibility of each state’s aircraft carriers
compatible with the aircraft used by the other.
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global exercise of power by either state.214  This intent to deploy both
French and British forces on the same aircraft carrier is the clearest example 
of the level of increased cooperation and interoperability envisioned 
by the 2010 Treaty.  Besides the physical integration of their military 
assets, the Parties agreed to jointly develop military doctrine and training 
programs, acquire and develop defense technologies and equipment,
coordinate logistically, and defend against common security threats such
as cyber terrorism.215  Specific capability areas in which development is
to be focused include coordination of transport aircraft fleets, submarine
systems, satellite systems, strategic lift and air-to-air refueling, and
unmanned drones.216  These new capabilities will allow the Parties to 
operate in conjunction with the other, yet each retains the ability to act
individually,217 a necessary provision to preserve each state’s sovereign
power. 
C. The Implementation of the Treaty 
1. Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) Capability 
The CJEF capability is scheduled to be fully operational by 2016.218 
Several important steps towards its implementation have taken place 
since the signing of the 2010 Treaty.  In 2011, preliminary joint exercises
took place between French and British troops to assess the interoperability 
of the two militaries and identify areas in which further work was 
necessary.219  Then, in October 2012, the first CJEF exercises were conducted
in the Mediterranean.220 The practice operation involved naval and
amphibious capabilities, simulating an intervention under international 
214. Id.; Press Release, UK Ministry of Defence, UK-France Defence Co-Operation 
Treaty Announced, supra note 211. 
215. See UK-France 2010 Summit Declaration on Defence and Security Co­
operation, supra note 150, ¶¶ 7–9. 
216. See id. ¶¶ 10–17. 
217.  2010 Defense and Security Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 1.
218. Press Release, UK Ministry of Defense, Major Anglo-French Exercise Gets 
Underway in the Mediterranean (Oct. 26, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ 
major-anglo-french-exercise-gets-underway-in-the-mediterranean; Franco-British Summit 
2012 Declaration on Security and Defense, ¶¶ 10–12, Feb. 17, 2012, available at
http://ambafrance-uk.org/Franco-British-summit-2012. 
219. Press Release, France Ministère de la Défense, Exercice Flandres 2011 (June 
7, 2011), http://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/exercice-flandres-2011/flandres-eng; Flanders 
2011: Franco-British military exercises, AMBAFRANCE, http://ambafrance-uk.org/Flanders- 
2011-Franco-British (last visited Feb. 21, 2013). 
220. France and UK conduct joint military exercise off Corsica, AMBAFRANCE
(Nov. 11, 2012), available at http://ambafrance-uk.org/France-and-UK-conduct-joint. 
The operation was named the ‘Corsican Lion.’ Id.
414
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mandate in a politically weak country ravaged by piracy.221  The  two-
month long exercise involved several thousand British and French military
personnel, a French aircraft carrier, and several British warships.222  Until 
the CJEF capability is fully operational, the rapid response capability of the
Parties will be an Intermediate Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (i-
CJEF), which will be deployable in Spring 2013.223  Joint exercises between 
the Parties’ military units allow for training on each other’s weaponry
and machinery224 and practice in side-by-side command and control of
operations,225 which are important to help overcome language and cultural
barriers. The CJEF and i-CJEF exercises have shown that successful
interoperability is possible. 
2. Aircraft and Drones 
Air capabilities are essential to the effective exercise of power on a 
global scale.  Under the 2010 Treaty, France and the UK will jointly fund 
the development and acquisition of manned and unmanned air
capabilities.226 Initially, the UK intends to refurbish its aircraft carriers to 
enable French aircraft to operate from them.227  Both countries will then
acquire the same aircraft and develop a common support plan to reduce 
costs and increase interoperability.228  Cooperation in air-to-air refueling
 221. Id. 
222. Press Release, UK Ministry of Defence, Major Anglo-French Exercise Gets 
Underway in the Mediterranean, supra note 218. 
223. Press Release, UK Ministry of Defence, UK and French Troops Increase 
Interoperability (Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-french­
troops-increase-interoperability.
224. For example, British paratroopers practiced jumping from French aircraft with
French parachutes and equipment, and vice versa. Press Release, UK Ministry of Defence,
British and French Troops Parachute Together (July 10, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/news/british-and-french-troops-parachute-together.  Another exercise allowed the
paratroopers to train on the others’ standard weaponry, and practice joint urban fighting
skills. Press Release, UK Ministry of Defence, Paratroopers Train with French Airborne 
Cavalry (Mar. 15, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/paratroopers-train-with­
french-airborne-cavalry—2. 
225. Press Release, UK Ministry of Defence, UK and French Troops Increase 
Interoperability, supra note 222. 
226. UK-France 2010 Summit Declaration on Defence and Security Co-operation, 
supra note 150. 
227. Id. ¶ 9.
228. Id. ¶ 10. 
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is being investigated229 as it is a necessary capability to increase the global
reach of both states. The UK and France also plan to jointly fund the
study of combat unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities by French
and British engineering companies230 and procure UAV technology, 
including Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) capabilities.231  In
2013, France will evaluate its need for the Watchkeeper drone, a British
UAV system,232 which could provide even further opportunities for 
cooperation and cost sharing.
V. APPLICATION OF THE 2010 SECURITY AND DEFENSE COOPERATION 
TREATY TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS
Even in the early stages of the implementation of the 2010 Treaty,
France and the UK were given several opportunities to practice joint 
military intervention.  The improvements in military capability and
coordination brought about by the 2010 Treaty have already allowed France 
and the UK to undertake a greater role in humanitarian interventions. 
These enhanced capabilities will facilitate future interventions led by 
France and the UK under the R2P doctrine. 
A. Lessons from Libya (2011)
UN authorization of intervention in Libya to protect civilians233 
provided the first opportunity to test the new military cooperation.
France and the UK were at the forefront of the decision to intervene, by 
leading the call for intervention234 and jointly drafting the UN resolution 
229. Id. ¶ 15. 
230. In the summer of 2012, France and the UK announced a joint $15.7 million
research study on combat UAV’s to be undertaken by the British company BAE Systems
and the French company Dassault. Pierre Tran, France, U.K. Sign Deals on Watchkeeper, 
UCAV, DEFENSENEWS (July 24, 2012), http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120724/ 
DEFREG01/307240007/France-U-K-Sign-Deals-Watchkeeper-UCAV. 
231. Franco-British Summit 2012 Declaration on Security and Defense, supra note 
218, ¶ 16. 
232. Linda Verhaeghe, Coopération militaire et Europe de la Défense au menu de 
la visite de M. le Drian à Londres, FRANCE MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/cooperation-militaire-et-europe-de-la-defense­
au-menu-de-la-visite-de-m.-le-drian-a-londres. 
233. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 59. 
234. Dominique Moisi points to “France’s seemingly natural propensity to
intervene” in addition to domestic concerns (particularly France’s close ties to the region,
including the large immigrant population from the Maghreb), and the personalities of
President Sarkozy and Qaddafi, as reasons for France’s push for intervention.
Dominique Moisi, France had a duty to intervene in Libya, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 
2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/23/france-libya-sarkozy.  In 
the UK, intervention was supported across the leadership of political parties.  David 
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authorizing a no-fly zone over Libya and air strikes for the protection of 
civilians.235  Prior to the UN authorization of the use of force, the two 
countries even held bilateral talks on their military options during an EU 
summit on Libya.236  Because both governments so strongly supported 
military action, French and British air and naval capabilities were heavily
used in the operation.237  France was the first state to officially recognize
the legitimacy of the rebel leadership in Libya after the military operation 
began,238 while the UK waited a few months to do so.239 
Resolution 1973 invoked the R2P doctrine as justification for the
intervention in Libya, marking it the most significant application of the 
new doctrine to date. The Resolution noted “the responsibility of the 
Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population” and their failure to 
do so.240  It also authorized other states to take “all necessary measures . . .
to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”241 
Commentators are split on how strongly the action in Libya reaffirmed
Owen, We Have Proved in Libya That Intervention Can Still Work, THE TELEGRAPH
(Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian ocean/libya/ 
8717986/We-have-proved-in-Libya-that-intervention-can-still-work.html.  However, some 
observers believe that British support for intervention was based primarily on energy
concerns.  STRATFOR, France, U.K. Have Differing Motives for Intervening in Libya, 
FORBES (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/energysource/ 2011/03/29/france-u­
k-have-differing-motives-for-intervening-in-libya/. 
235. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 59; Libya: UK and French No-Fly Zone Plan
Gathers Pace, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world­
africa-12672640; Ewan MacAskill et al., Libya Crisis: Britain, France, and US Prepare 
for Air Strikes Against Gaddafi, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2011/mar/17/libya-no-fly-zone-united-nations. 
236. See France, UK Flex Muscles at EU Summit on Libya, EURACTIV (Dec. 22,
2011), http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/france-uk-flex-muscles-eu-summit-news­
503030. 
237. Libya: US, UK and France Attack Gaddafi Forces, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Mar.
20, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12796972. 
238. Libya: France Recognises Rebels as Government, BBC NEWS EUROPE (Mar.
10, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12699183; Alan Cowell & Steven 
Erlanger, France Becomes First Country to Recognize Libyan Rebels, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/europe/11france.html?_r=1&. 
239. Ian Black, Libyan Rebels Win Recognition and Promise of Financial Support, 
THE GUARDIAN (July 15, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/15/libyan­
rebels-recognition-financial-support; Libya Condemns UK for Recognising Rebels as 
Sole Power, BBC NEWS AFRICA (July 28, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world­
africa-14320199. 
240. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 59. 
241. Id. ¶ 4.
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and strengthened the R2P doctrine for use in future interventions.242 
However, France and the UK view the operation as a success.  Avoiding 
a veto in the Security Council for authorization of the use of force was a
victory in itself, since China and the Russian Federation declined to use
the veto in light of regional support for intervention.243  Additionally,
France and the UK demonstrated their increasing capability to undertake 
such an operation without the U.S. taking the lead.244 
Although the air campaign highlighted weaknesses in the bilateral 
alliance’s ability to undertake interventions without U.S. help, France 
and the UK still have the opportunity to address those flaws.  The U.S. 
had to use Tomahawk cruise missiles on some targets to allow French
and British bombing flights, but once the bombing campaign began, the 
European members of NATO ran critically low on bombs, requiring a 
purchase from the U.S. in the middle of the operation.245  The U.S. had 
also provided most of the aerial refueling and reconnaissance, usually 
242. Gareth Evans, co-chair of the ICISS, argues that the R2P doctrine “came of 
age” in 2011, and the doctrine now enjoys “overwhelming consensus . . . on [its] basic 
principles” in the international community.  Gareth Evans, End of the Argument: How
We Won the Debate over Stopping Genocide, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/11/28/gareth_evans_end_of_the_argument?
page=0,0.  In contrast, Saira Mohamed notes the importance of U.S. recognition of and
apparent adherence to the R2P principle, but states: “While the intervention may appear 
at first glance to be a shining moment for the responsibility to protect, a closer
examination reveals both the narrowness of the principle as represented in the
Libya intervention and the limited role the responsibility to protect appeared to play in
the U.S. government’s decision to support military action.”  Saira Mohamed, Taking
Stock of the Responsibility to Protect, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 319, 330 (2012).  Stewart 
Patrick argues that the success of the Libyan intervention, which met the doctrine’s 
benchmarks for legality, strengthened the doctrine.  Stewart Patrick, A New Lease on Life
for Humanitarianism: How Operation Odyssey Dawn Will Revive RtoP, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67674/stewart-patrick/a-new­
lease-on-life-for-humanitarianism?page=show. He also argues that, because of the 
unique factors at play in the Libyan case, such success is unlikely to be repeated and the 
doctrine is unlikely to be applied universally by the U.S. and its allies.  Stewart Patrick,
Libya and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention: How Qaddafi’s Fall Vindicated
Obama and RtoP, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 
articles/68233/stewart-patrick/libya-and-the-future-of-humanitarian-intervention?page=show. 
243. The implementation of a no-fly zone over Libya was supported by the Arab
League, and the regional members (Lebanon, Gabon, and Nigeria) of the Security
Council. Press Release, Sec. Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over 
Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in 
Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. 
244. “European powers carried out the vast majority of the air strikes and only one 
of the 18 ships enforcing the arms embargo was American.”  Eric Westervelt, NATO’s 
Intervention in Libya: A New Model?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.
npr.org/2011/09/12/140292920/natos-intervention-in-libya-a-new-model. 
245. Id.; Owen, supra note 234. 
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drone, flights.246  These weaknesses—a lack of weaponry and air
capabilities—were all identified in the 2010 Treaty, and this “real world” 
illustration of their significance will provide even greater impetus for 
France and the UK to act cooperatively to improve their capacities in
these areas.  However, the most difficult issue raised by the Libyan 
intervention cannot be solved by agreement between France and the UK. 
Other than the U.S., France, and Britain, support for the intervention
within NATO was weak,247 again demonstrating the looming difficulty
for France and Britain – that they, like the U.S. in NATO, will be solely
responsible for European defense. Although both countries plan to slash
their national defense budgets, the 2010 Treaty’s bilateral cooperation will 
allow both to increase their global participation.  France and the UK have 
chosen to proceed bilaterally to strengthen and increase defense capabilities, 
because prior attempts, such as Saint Malo, to encourage the rest of Europe
to move forward with them, have not resulted in matching capabilities 
from other European nations. 
B. Mali (2013) 
In January 2013, France sent troops to fight Islamist rebel groups in 
northern Mali.248  France declared that its legal basis to do so arose from
a specific request for military aid from the Malian president249 since UN 
Security Council Resolution 2085 authorized only an African-led
International Support Mission in Mali.250  Under Article 5 of the 2010 
246. Westervelt, supra note 244. 
247. Only eight of twenty-eight NATO members participated in the Libyan
intervention, while Germany, a leader within the EU in some respects even more powerful
than France and Britain, refused to participate.  Owen, supra note 234; Westervelt, supra note 
244. 
248. See Jean-François Bayart, Mali: le choix raisonné de la France, LE MONDE
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2013/01/22/mali-le-choix-raisonne­
de-la-france_1820680_3232.html. 
249. Natalie Nougayrède, La lettre du président malien, base légale de
l’intervention français, LE MONDE (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/ 
2013/01/25/la-base-legale-de-l-action-francaise-une-lettre-de-m-traore_1822493_3212. html; 
see La mission au Mali et la légalité “onusienne”, LE MONDE (Jan. 26, 2013), http://www. 
lemonde.fr/idees/article/2013/01/26/la-mission-au-mali-et-la-legalite-onusienne_1822959 
_3232.html. 
250. S.C. Res. 2085, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2085 (Dec. 20, 2012); Press Release, Sec. 
Council, Security Council Authorizes Deployment of African-Led International Support 
Mission in Mali for Initial Year-Long Period, U.N. Press Release SC/10870 (Dec. 20, 
2012), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10870.doc.htm. 
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Treaty, by which the deployment of armed forces remains a national 
decision,251 Britain had publically stated support for the French intervention 
but refused to participate in any way other than logistical support.252 
The UK will not send its own troops to Mali in a combat role,253 but has
agreed to send surveillance254 and transport aircraft to be used in the French
operation.255  The U.S. has also agreed to support the mission, pledging
in-flight refueling, satellite intelligence capabilities,256 and providing 
logistical support and transport of French troops and equipment to the
African nation.257  The French intervention was intended to last until the
force authorized by Resolution 2085, composed of troops from neighboring
African countries, could be organized and deployed.258  This intervention 
demonstrates the flexibility of the 2010 Treaty, because neither France 
nor the UK is forced to commit its troops to an intervention unsupported
by national decision makers.  In January 2014, French President Francois
Hollande announced that, as the “key objectives of the mission have been
accomplished,” the troop size would be reduced.259 
251.  2010 Defense and Security Treaty, supra note 2, art. 5, ¶ 1.
252. Official Statement, UK Office of the Prime Minister, Statement on PM Call
with President Hollande (Jan. 12, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement- 
on-pm-call-with-president-hollande; Press Release, UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office
and Ministry of Def., UK to Provide Logistical Military Assistance to Mali (Jan. 14, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-provide-logistical-military-assistance- to-mali. 
253.  Official Statement on PM Call with President Hollande, supra note 252. 
254. Press Release, UK Ministry of Def., RAF Sentinel Aircraft Deploys to Africa 
(Jan. 25, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/raf-sentinel-aircraft-deploys-to-africa. 
255.  Press Release, UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Assistance
for French Mali Operation (Jan. 13, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/united­
kingdom-assistance-for-french-mali-operation.
256. Edward Cody, French Military Intervention in Mali Expands, WASH. POST
(Jan. 13, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-13/world/36311896_1_malian- 
army-islamist-militias-french-deployment. 
257. French-Led Intervention in Mali Picks Up Speed, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 27,
2013), available at http://www.nprberlin.de/post/french-led-intervention-mali-picks­
speed. The U.S. supports an intervention in Mali to combat the terrorist rebel groups in
the northern part of the country, but will not participate directly in the intervention 
alongside France because Mali’s democratically elected president was overthrown in a 
March 2012 coup. Id. See also Mali: logistique américaine et troupes tchadiennes, LE 
MONDE, (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/01/22/mali-logistique- 
americaine-et-troupes-tchadiennes_1820735_3212.html. 
258. Cody, supra note 256. French President Francois Hollande has said that the 
military deployment in Mali will last “as long as necessary.” France Confirms Mali
Military Intervention, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world­
africa-20991719.  The intended strength of the African contingent has already been 
increased from 3,200 to 5,700 troops, in addition to 2,200 troops promised by Chad. 
French-Led Intervention in Mali Picks Up Speed, supra note 257. 
259. France to Cut Troop Numbers in Mali, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www. 
aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/01/france-cut-troop-numbers-mali-2014191453076573. html. 
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C. Possible Intervention in Syria 
Civil strife in Syria, which began in the spring of 2011,260 is a likely 
candidate for an international intervention in the coming months. France,
Syria’s former colonial power, has been at the forefront of international 
condemnation of the actions of the government.  In fact, France was the 
first Western power to formally recognize the legitimacy of the Syrian 
opposition coalition.261  France has also been vocal in calling for UN
action, including military action if the Syrian government continues its 
noncompliance with international human rights standards.262  As of January
2013, Russia and China had vetoed three separate proposed UN Security
Council resolutions that impose sanctions and allow for the possibility of
intervention in Syria.263  Despite these setbacks, the UK and France 
remain publically committed to halting the human rights abuses in Syria 
and support a regime change within the state.264  The impact of the Syrian
crisis on Turkey, a NATO member, also creates a great deal of pressure on 
France, the UK, and other NATO members.265  The UK has pledged money 
260. James Robbins, How Syria sank into all-out civil war, BBC NEWS MIDDLE 
EAST (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25755987. 
261. Steven Erlanger & Rick Gladstone, France Grants Its Recognition to Syria
Rebels, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13. 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/world/middleeast/ 
syria-war-developments.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  “I announce that France recognizes the
Syrian National Coalition as the sole representative of the Syrian people and thus as the 
future provisional government of a democratic Syria and to bring an end to Bashar al­
Assad’s regime.” (quoting French President Francois Hollande). Id.
 262. Syria crisis: France Raises Use of Force, BBC NEWS MIDDLE EAST (Apr. 25,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17847584. 
263. Russia and China were the only two Security Council members to vote against 
the resolution in July 2012, which would have imposed economic sanctions on Syria for
failing to implement the UN and Arab League peace plan.  Russia’s representative stated
that the Western countries wanted to use Syrian sanctions and a possible regime change 
to decrease Iran’s regional influence.  Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and 
China Veto Another Resolution on Syria Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/middleeast/russia-and-china-veto-un-sanctions-against-syria.
html?_r=0; see also MacFarquar, supra note 61. 
264. Press Release, UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Foreign Secretary’s 
Remarks with French Foreign Minister Fabius in New York on the Situation in Syria (Aug.
30, 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretarys-remarks-with-french­
foreign-minister-fabius-in-new-york-on-the-situation-in-syria?view=News&id=805304 082. 
265. Turkey is experiencing a dramatic influx of Syrian refugees—over 120,00
people have fled Syria for Turkey.  Turkey has called for assistance in establishing ‘safe
zones’ along the border with Syria to protect the refugees, most of whom are in camps. 
Jeremy Bowen, Turkey: Risk Worth Taking for Syria Safe Zones, BBC NEWS MIDDLE 
EAST (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19753795.  In
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to help Syria’s neighbors cope with the influx of refugees,266 while France
continues to be a leading supporter of the Syrian rebel coalition.267 
Ultimately, the application of the R2P doctrine to the humanitarian crisis
in Syria is clear, but the Security Council veto stands in the way of any 
intervention to halt the suffering. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The parallel ambitions of France and the UK have continually driven
the two countries to participate in unprecedented military cooperation 
and integration.  While these two countries in particular have been moving 
towards such collaboration during the last several decades, it is an unlikely
model for success in any other situation. France and Britain, the leaders
of European defense, have previously attempted to encourage the rest of
the EU to develop their defense capabilities. When both states realized
they might soon be the sole providers of European defense, they cooperated 
to increase their capabilities and reduce their individual defense costs.
This form of deep integration is possible because of the history of
integration between these states within the EU framework.  The bilateral
agreement is intended to work within the multilateral frameworks in
which both participate—the United Nations, NATO, and the EU.  An
increase in Franco-British military capability reduces the pressure on the 
United States, within the UN and NATO, to act nearly unilaterally to 
halt humanitarian crises.  This increase in capabilities will also allow for 
the EU to exercise its power on a global scale, particularly if other EU
Member States follow the lead of France and the UK in working together to
acquire and develop military capabilities and technologies. 
France and Britain, strong proponents of humanitarian intervention,
are willing to take the lead on such operations where other actors do not 
commit themselves to the effort. The increase in capabilities driven by
the 2010 Treaty allows France and the UK to have more influence in the 
military decisions of NATO and the EU, since they may now contribute 
meaningful capabilities to any multilateral military operation.  Both France
and the UK remain proponents of the R2P doctrine, and are capable of 
December 2012, NATO approved the move of Patriot missiles into Turkey to increase 
security against a missile attack from Syria.  NATO and Turkey also fear the use of 
chemical weapons by Syria. Syria Crisis: NATO Approves Patriots for Turkey, BBC NEWS 
MIDDLE EAST (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20590129. 
266. Syria Conflict: Britain to Provide Extra £21m in Aid, BBC NEWS UK (Jan.
26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21208956. 
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undertaking future interventions under the doctrine more easily because 
of the joint development of their military capabilities.
Humanitarian interventions require both the capability and political
will to intervene. With the implementation of the 2010 Treaty, France 
and the UK now possess, or are in the process of developing, the requisite 
military capabilities to intervene in humanitarian crises across the globe. 
The largest hindrance to any potential intervention is the lack of political
will to do so in the domestic structures of competent states.  France and 
the UK are more focused on humanitarian crises and issues, like the rest
of Europe, than other dominant military powers, and are seemingly more
willing to intervene.  Previously, as separate actors, these two states were
incapable of leading interventions, but often called for interventions in 
humanitarian crises.  France in particular has often been vocal about its
desire to intervene, and it now possesses the capability to enable it to do so
essentially on its own.  Still, both states are adamant that a case-by-case
balancing of domestic issues must guide the decision to intervene, and 
intervention will only occur where there is a clear political objective.
Both France and the UK have begun to consider national security more on 
a global scale, so that events in other states, including humanitarian crises, 
are now deemed a matter of national import. Both states desire to expand 
their global influence, and the “interventionist” niche in the international 
community is not currently occupied by any other military power.  Europe,
led by the UK and France, is the most likely candidate to take the lead in 
this field, because the 2010 Treaty gives France and the UK the military 
capabilities to enforce their humanitarian values on a global scale.
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